Railways in
Ukraine
A Ukrainian Railways train on an international passenger service
stands at Przemyśl Główny station, Poland.
A military railway was constructed by British forces in Crimea (present day Krym) during the Crimean War. It was built to support the siege of Sevastopol, and ran from the harbour at Balakava to the British headquarters on the plateau above the besieged city. Material for its construction left England in December, 1854, arriving in February, 1855. By the end of March, the 11km line was operational. The line was built to standard (4ft 8½in, 1435mm). Suggestions that the gauge was actually 5ft 6in (1675mm) have been shown to be erroneous. The line was initially horse drawn, with one rope worked incline. 5 locomotives arrived in November, but by that time Sevastopol had already fallen. The railway continued to operate supporting British troops, but had fallen into disrepair. A new line of better quality but on a similar route opened in November; an extension to serve the headquarters of Sardinian forces was completed and a similar one for French forces commenced. The total final length of line was around 23km. Following the cessation of hostilities in 1856, the railway was dismantled and all its assets dispersed, the tracks being sold to the Ottoman Empire.
The first public railway to open in present day Ukraine, and the oldest surviving railway, runs from the Polish border near Przemyśl to Lviv. It opened in 1861, the last section of a line from Kraków to Lemberg (Lviv), when both cities were in Galicia, a province of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The territory formed part of Poland from 1922 until the Second World War, after which it was partitioned between Poland and the Ukrainian SSR of the former Soviet Union, with the SSR becoming the independent republic of Ukraine in 1991.
The line to Lviv was built to the standard gauge of 1435mm, as were most other lines in the same region, whereas lines in those parts of Ukraine that had formed part of the Russian Empire were for the most part built to the Russian standard gauge of 1520mm gauge. A few narrow gauge forestry and industrial lines were built to 750mm, 760mm, or even 600mm gauge.
After the Second World War, the Soviet administration converted almost all the remaining 1435mm gauge lines in the Ukraine to 1520mm. This is therefore the predominant gauge today. During the same period, remaining 760mm gauge lines were converted to 750mm gauge.
Following independence in 1991, Ukrainian Railways was created, which remains the infrastructure authority and the predominant operator of the national network, although in recent years a few independent freight operators have started to provide services.
In 2014, following Russian military occupation and a referendum of disputed legality, Krym declared its independence from Ukraine and resolved to become part of the Russian Federation. The Union was ratified by Russia but has not been recognized by Ukraine nor by the greater part of the international community. However, the region effectively came under Russian control. Cross-border traffic between Krym and the rest of Ukraine almost entirely ceased. Rail services were transferred to a new Russian based company, Crimea Railway. The region being cut off from direct rail access to Russia became heavily dependent on a ferry service across the Kerch Strait. As a result, the Russian authorities constructed two new bridges across the Strait, a road bridge opening in 2018, and a parallel rail bridge in 2019.
Also in 2014, pro-Russian separatists staged a series uprisings in the Donbas region (Oblasts of Donećk and Luhansk) bringing roughly half of the region under separatist control. Cease fire agreements in 2014 and 2015 failed to hold, and sporadic fighting continued along the border between the separatist controlled area and the rest of Ukraine until the Russian invasion of 2022. Much rail infrastructure in the area was destroyed during the uprising, but rail connections with Russia were maintained. Rail operations in the occupied area were continued by the local administration of Donets Railway, which had been the regional subsidiary of Ukrainian Railways with headquarters in Donećk. In December 2014 a new regional headquarters for that part of Donets Railway remaining under Ukrainian control was established in Krasnyi Lyman. Krasnyi Lyman had been captured by secessionists early in the uprising but had returned to Ukrainian control in June 2014. The city officially changed its name to Lyman in 2016. Lyman was taken by advancing Russian forces in May, 2022.
The 2022 invasion by Russian forces has obviously caused significant damage in and near the areas where conflict has taken place on the ground. Elsewhere damage to rail infrastructure has been, with just a few exceptions, fairly minimal. Analysts believe that this is because the Russian forces initially intended to use the rail network to assist the progress of their invasion.
A missile attack against railway infrastructure in the Lviv area on 17 May, which amongst other things destroyed a key electrical substation, is believed to have been an attempt to limit military supplies and humanitarian aid entering the country from Poland. Damaged infrastructure was either quickly repaired or circumvented.
A number of rocket attacks have taken place against passenger station facilities, often when the stations in question were crowded with civilians attempting to leave the area. Most significant among these were Kramatorsk on 8 April, leading to over 50 deaths, and Chaplyne on 24 August, killing more than 25. There must be strong suspicion that these attacks were deliberately targeting civilians, although this is denied by the Russian authorities.
During March, 2022, Belarusian rail workers intiated a number of sabotage attacks against their own infrastructure, in an attempt to thwart the Russian advance into Ukraine. The long term effect of these actions is unknown, but with the Russian withdrawal from its attempts to capture Kyiv it is no longer immediately relevant. The cross-border rail links with Belarus remain closed.
In August a number of explosions damaged rail infrastructure in Krym. Speculation continues regarding who initiated these explosions and it is not known whether permanent damage resulted. Russian residents of Krym, some of whom had settled there since the annexation of 2014, were reported to be leaving for Russia via the Kerch Strait Bridge.
From early September, Ukrainian forces launched a major counter-offensive in the east and northeast, aimed at capturing or disabling the supply lines serving the occupying Russian forces in Donbas. At the beginning of October, Ukrainian forces retook control of the city of Lyman, which had been a major logistics hub on the Russian supply lines, and the location of an important railway junction in Donbas.
In the early morning of 8 October, an explosion on the bridge over the Kerch Strait connecting Russia with Krym, causing several spans of the road bridge to collapse. Debris from the explosion spread to the adjacent rail bridge, setting fire to a train of fuel tank wagons. According to Russian state news media, the explosion was caused by a truck bomb, although CCTV images that have been published of the event do not make it clear whether the explosion actually originated with a truck on the Russia to Krym bound carriageway or whether the truck simply happened to be in the place where the explosion took place. No entity has claimed responsibility for the blast. Both road and rail bridges were reported to have reopened within 24 hours, but the road bridge is limited to light traffic on a single carriageway, while rail traffic is using a single track owing to fire damage of the other track. This of course significantly impaired the function of the bridge in maintaining supplies to Krym and to Russian troops in southern Ukraine. The road bridge fully reopened to normal traffic in February, 2023, and the rail bridge in May, although some restoration work was ongoing and not completed until the autumn.
The month of October saw a significant rise in attacks on Ukrainian targets by loitering munitions (sometimes known as kamikaze drones), in many cases far from front lines. These attacks have targeted critical infrastructure, notably power generation and distribution. This caused some disruption to operation of the railways; in some regions previously stored diesel locomotives have been returned to service to provide cover where overhead electrical supply is out of commission or limited in order to prioritise other demands. Degradation of power supply nationally has called for measures to reduce consumption, which include a reduction in some urban transport services.
Since June there have been several instances of sabotage to railways within Russia, for which an anti-war activist group, Stop the Wagons, has claimed responsiblity. Notable among these was one at Novozybkov in October, which severed an important rail route from Russia to southern Belarus.
On 11 November, Ukrainian forces took back control of the city of Kherson and neighbouring parts of Kherson Oblast, including the area around Mykolaiv, following the withdrawal of Russian troops to the opposite side of the Dnipro river. Passenger train services from Kyiv to Mykolaiv started running on 14 November, and to Kherson on 19 November, for the first time since February. However, escalating bombardment of Kherson by Russian artillery from mid-December has caused large numbers of the civilian population to flee the city.
From February, 2023, British infrastructure company Network Rail began to supply Ukrainian Railways with specialist equipment and expertise to expidite repairs to war damaged sections of the railway.
Also in February, 2023, Ukrainian Railways instituted “a comprehensive programme of Ukrainisation, which does not just remove Soviet symbols and Russian names, but fundamentally changes Ukrainian railways.”
In March, 2023, the Norwegian Ministry of Transport announced that a fleet of 12 2-car diesel multiple units would be donated to Ukrainian Railways. They are type 92 units built in the 1980s by Duewag. On receipt, they were regauged from 1435mm to 1520mm in local workshops.
In April, 2023, full reconstruction of 2 railway bridges across the Irpin River near Kyiv was completed. The bridges were destroyed early in the invasion, one bridge being temporarily repaired. The full reconstruction will allow significantly increased traffic capacity and flexibility in the Kyiv area.
On 5 May, UK Defence Intelligence reported that “a recent uptick in Russian rail accidents in areas bordering Ukraine, attributed to sabotage committed by unknown actors, has almost certainly caused short-term localised disruption to Russian military rail movements. Although its Railway Troop Brigades are capable of restoring lines quickly, these incidents will increase pressure on Russia’s internal security forces, who will highly likely remain unable to fully protect Russia’s vast and vulnerable rail networks from attack.” It is widely speculated that such attacks are being conducted by pro-Ukrainian partisans within Russia.
On 18 May, a train was derailed near Simferopol, apparently as a consquence of sabotage. This blocked all rail access to the port of Sevastopol. Service would have quickly been restored, but once more demonstrates the vulnerability of Russian supply lines serving their Black Sea naval fleet based in Sevastopol, the rest of Krym, and the Russian occupied territories generally.
On 29 May, Russia announced the creation of federal state enterprise, Railways of Novorossiya, covering the operation of railways in the Russian-occupied regions of Donećk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson. The new entity has its head office in Donećk, and falls under the jurisdiction of the Russian federal railway agency Roszheldor.
Early in the morning of 17 July, Russian authorities announced that an “incident” had occurred on the Crimea Bridge, leading to the suspension of road and rail traffic and affecting passing shipping services. An explosion or explosions had taken place on the road bridge, it is not clear whether from fixed charges or a passing vehicle. The rail bridge was reopened to traffic a few hours later. Repairs to the road bridge were completed by mid-October, but for security reasons it is open to car traffic only. Heavy goods vehicles and fuel supplies continue to be moved by ferry.
In August, 2023, Kremenchuk based rolling stock manufacturer KVSZ was awarded a contract to build 10 5-car trains for Kyiv Metro. In October, they received the contract for 44 new night train carriages for use on the national network. These will in part replace ageing or war damaged vehicles, but also reflect an increase in demand for overnight domestic and international travel. Tenders have been invited for a further 16 or more carriages.
During 2023, Ukrainian Railways has issued invitations to tender for the supply of over 60 new passenger carriages for use on overnight services. These will in part replace ageing or war damaged vehicles, but also reflect an increase in demand for overnight domestic and international travel. In October, a contract for 44 of these was awarded to KVSZ.
In October, 2023, UK Defence Intelligence reported that rail networks in Russian occupied territories were largely viable, in spite of sporadic attacks by Ukrainian artillery, and were vital to Russian forces for logistical support. It appears that a new railway line in under construction from Taganrog, Russia, to connect with existing railways in Donećk Oblast. According to Russian sources, it will cross the Russian/Ukrainian border near Kuznetsovo-Mykhailivka and join the existing Mariupol to Volnovakha railway at a point near Anadol’. This would provide access northwards to Donećk and via Mariupol westwards to Krym. The sources report that construction began in September of a bridge over the Kalmius River near the village of Hranitne.
In November, 2023, it was reported that acts of sabotage continue to be perpetrated against railways within Russia. These acts are likely committed by anti-war protest groups. The actual number of occurrences is not known, but an independent Russian media outlet suggests that 76 cases had been brought to court since the invasion of 2022.
In November, 2023, Ukrainian railways company UZ signed a memorandum of understanding with South Korean rail operator Korail and rail construction and management company Korea National Railway for cooperation on seven railway reconstruction projects. These include building a high speed railway in the border area between Ukraine and Poland, increasing the capacity of existing railways connecting the three southern cities of Odesa, Izmail, and Reni, and building a new railway traffic control center. Train manufacturer Hyundai-Rotem is expected to supply trains for the high speed railway.
In December, 2023, it was announced that United States Agency for International Development had signed a memorandum of understanding with UZ for assistance in the development of a 75km standard gauge line from a connection with the existing standard gauge line from Poland at Mostyska near the Polish border and paralleling the existing 1520mm gauge line to Sknyliv yard about 10km west of Lviv city centre. This is a convenient location for freight transfer, while passenger traffic will be catered for by a dedicated express train service connecting Lviv-Holovnyi station, the airport, and Sknyliv station.
Also in December, 2023, Ukrainian Railways unveiled a new type of grain hopper car, constructed in-house from readily available components. THe new car is capable of gauge changing between 1520mm and 1435mm, and could thus facilitate grain exports to other European conutries. It is anticipated that they could enter quantity production soon.
Also in December, 2023, Ukrainian Railways launched an international freight ferry service with Poland carrying HGV trucks and semitrailers on special flat wagons.
On 26 December, 2023, Kherson railway station came under heavy shelling, apparently targeting an evacuation train that had been due to depart with up to 140 passengers. Quick action by police in directing people away from the area undoubtedly saved many lives, sadly one policeman was killed and two policemen and two civilians were injured by shrapnel as a result of the attack.
In February, 2024, it was reported that Russian occupying forces had assembled a barrier of redundant railway carriages and wagons on one track of the two track main line between Olenivka and Volnovakha, a distance of about 28 km, to the southwest of Donećk. It is speculated that this may be part of a new defensive front line, or that it may be intended to protect supply traffic using the other track of the two track formation from missile attack.
In March, 2024, Ukrainian Railways ordered a fleet of 66 new passenger carriages from Ukrainian manufacturer KVSZ.
In April, 2024, construction began on a new 22km standard (1435mm) gauge railway between Chop and Uzhhorod, one of a noumber of proposed railways intended to facilitate freight transfer between Ukraine and the EU. Both cities are already railheads for cross-border standard gauge lines.
Also in April, Export-Import Bank of the United States approved a USD156.6m loan for the purchase of 30 TE33A Evolution 1520mm gauge diesel locomotives from Wabtec, likely to be extended to 40 locomotives. Up to 10% of the components of the order will be manufactured in Ukraine. The locomotives are expected to enter service from 2025 and will join a number of similar locomotives delivered before the invasion.
In May, 2024, Ukraine received the first shipment of new steel rail being donated by Japan. A total of 25,000 tonnes of rail, equivalent to 190km of track, is expected to be delivered by the end of the year. Ukraine is entirely dependant on foreign produced rail since the destruction of its only domestic production facility in Mariupol.
In July, 2024, funding was agreed and tenders were announced for the supply of 80 new electric freight locomotives for Ukrainian Railways.
Also in July, rolling stock manufacturer RMF Karpaty announced that it had developed 5 new types of grain hopper wagons which will be built with a greater proportion of domestically produced components than previous types. Later in the month, Lithuanian freight carrier LTG Cargo placed orders 500 grain hopper wagons with Ukrainian manufacturers Karpaty and KVBZ. These wagons are planned for delivery in 2024 and 2025 and are expected to be used for moving Ukrainian grain for export via the Lithuanian port of Klaipėda.
In August, 2024, it was announced that Ukrainian Railways are planning to purchase 20 new electric multiple units from Hyundai Rotem of South Korea. These will join 10 similar units already in use on Intercity+ services.
In December, 2024, the European Bank for Reconsruction and development announced a EUR300 million loan to Ukrainian Railways for the purchase of new electric locomotives. This will be supplemented by USD190 million from the USA, administered by the World Bank.
In March, 2025, Ukrainian Railways suffered a massive Russian cyberattack. All online systems went down, including online ticketing and movement scheduling. UR were able to circumvent the effects by deploying extra front line staff for manual ticket sales at stations and on trains, and by adopting a well rehearsed backup system for supervising train movements. Safety critical systems, such as signalling, were not affected.
During the night of 31 May/1 June, 2025, two railway bridges collapsed, apparently as the result of sabotage, widely supposed to have been committed by pro-Ukrainian sympathisers. The locations were over 100km apart, and each around 70km from the Ukrainian border. The first occurred in the late evening of 31 May in the Vygonichi district of the Bryansk region, when a highway bridge carrying HGVs collapsed onto a passenger train passing underneath, rersulting in multiple injuries and fatalities. The second, in the early morning of 1 June in the Zheleznogorsk district of the Kursk region, when a rail bridge collapsed, derailing a freight train and injuring the crew. Although attacks on Russian rail infrastructure are not unknown, there is speculation that these two incidents may have been orchestrated to provide a diversion from a major Ukrainian drone attack on Russian airbases, which took place later in the day on 1 June.
On 2 June, the Kerch Bridge was attacked by an underwater explosion. In this instance, the road bridge was reopened within a few hours. The rail bridge appears to be unaffected. However, it is worth noting that the bridges are presently of less strategic importance to the Rusian forces than they once were, as the greater part of incoming supplies is now carried by ferry.
On the night of 4/5 August, 2025, the railway station at Lozova was hit by a Russian drone attack, leading to the death of one rail worker, injuring 10 others, and extensive damage to trains and infrastructure. Through trains were diverted by other lines, with diesel haulage being brought in from other areas because of damage to the electrical infrastructure.
On 4 October, 2025, Russian drones deliberately targeted two passenger trains at Shostka station. One death and at least 30 injuries were reported. Local train seriices and main line seervices to and from Kyiv were disrupted.
In October, 2025, it was announced that Ukrainian Railways concluded an agreement with Alstom for the purchase of 55 Traxx dual voltage electric locomotives. The locomotives will be built in France and delivery will commence in 2027.
On the night of 5/6 December, 2025, the station building at the important railway junction of Fastiv was destroyed in a massive Russian drone attack, thankfully without loss of life. Train services were immediately suspended, but restored within 24 hours, served by a temporary station building in the form of an inflatable shelter, complete with refreshments, a children’s play area, and a Christmas tree.
In December, 2025, as part of a valuable export order for long established wagon builder Dniprovagonmash, the first of a series of bogie flat container wagons ws shipped to Germany for Deutsche Bahn. The standard gauge wagons were carried by road to Hungary, for transit by rail from there.
On 27 January, 2026, a passenger train in the Kharkiv region was struck by a targeted missile attack. 2 carriages were destroyed by fire. At least 5 people died, but thankfully hundreds of passengers aboard the train managed to escape.
On 6 March, 2026, there was a particularly heavy series of attacks on railway infrastructure in the Vinnytsia and Zhytomyr regions. Considerable disruption was caused, although reconstruction work was quickly put in hand.
In April, 2026, it was announced that many components of the 55 UA8AC electric locomotives currently on order from Alstom will be manufactured in Ukraine.
In May, 2026, the European Bank for Reconstruction & Development (EBRD) announced that it, in conjunction with the EU and the UK, will provide support to Ukrainian railway Ukrzaliznytsia to finance the supply and installation of up to 200MW of decentralised small-scale gas-fired power-generation capacity at selected sites to help address an electricity deficit and ensure an uninterrupted supply of energy to households and businesses. EBRD said large-scale generating plants are relatively easy targets for missiles and drone attacks.
In July, 2026, Ukrainian Railways reported that 192 locomotives had been damaged by Russian attacks in the first half of the year, compared with just 217 in the whole of the 4 years since the invasion. Authorities see this as a deliberate escalation aimed at disrupting the rail system.
On 13 September, 2026, during a period of generally heightened attacks on railway infrastructure, a train was struck by a heavy bombardment at the town of Yohodyn, near the Polish border, just hours after a train carrying senior European and British security advisers had passed through. The train was evacuated before the bombardment and there were no casualties.
Information on international links with Poland is believed to be correct as of January, 2022, and subsequently updated. Details of other international links are based on a map of Ukrainian Railways dated 2013, updated by such information as is readily available.
All international passenger services ceased in 2020 as a result of covid precautions. From the start of the invasion in 2022, many evacuation trains have operated to various destinations in Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, and Poland. Regular, though infrequent, Ukrainian Railways international services with friendly countries had for the most part resumed by July.
Moldova
A non-electrified single track line between Serpneve and Basarabeasca, Moldova, closed in 1999, was reopened in 2022. This provides a route between Odesa and the Danube port of Galați, Romania, avoiding a break of gauge and bypassing the breakaway Moldovan region of Pridnestrovie.
A non-electrified double track line between Kuchurhan and Tiraspol in Pridnestrovie. This was formerly the route of a through train from Moscow, Russia, to București, Romania. Change from 1520mm to 1435mm gauge took place at Iași, Romania, where carriage bogies were swapped while passengers remained on board the train. This service ceased in 2020, along with other international passenger services. There had been little or no freight service on the route, largely because of poor transhipment facilities at Iași. An international passenger service between Odesa and Chișinău was reinstated in 2021, but discontinued with the outbreak of war. No services now use the line.
Non-electrified single track connections between Slobidka and Cobasna, Mohyliv-Podilskyi and Otaci, Sokyriany and Ocnița, Kelmentsi and Lipcani, and Mamalyha and Lipcani, are all believed to be out of use.
A non-electrified single track connection between Mohyliv-Podilskyi and Otaci was also believed to be out of use, but was reactivated in November 2022 to carry a thrice weekly passenger service between Kyiv and Chișinău, with connections at Ungheni for Socola and Iași, Romania. In October, 2025, an overnight sleeper service from Kyiv to București, Romania, was introduced, with gauge changing at Iași. In March, 2026, it was proposed that a direct service from Kyiv to Sofia, Bulgaria, be introduced, operating over the same route. In 2026, the overnight service to Chișinău service became daily, and was extended to Revaca station, near Chișinău International Airport, with a bus shuttle service to the airport itself.
Romania
A non-electrified single track freight line between Vadul-Siret and Vicșani, Romania, with gauge transshipment at Vicșani. Capacity at Vicșani was enhanced during 2022 with additional tracks for both 1435mm and 1520mm gauge. In June, 2024, Romanian independent freight operator GFR opened a new transhipment facility, predominantly grain oriented, at Dornești. Although not specifically mentioned in published information, it seems that this would have required an 8km extension of the existing 1520mm gauge line from Vicșani to Dornești. In August, 2025, contracts were signed for the electrification of this line from the existing electrified line at Dărmănești to the Ukrainian border.
The Romanian narrow gauge forestry railway CFF Viseu de Sus does not reach Ukraine but extends very close to the border. In addition to its customary commercial activities, it is also used by Romanian border police to access this remote area with few roads by means of a Mercedes Sprinter minibus modified to run on the railway.
A non-electrified single track line between Rakhiv and Valea Vișeului, Romania, out of service since 2007, reopened in November 2022, with gauge transhipment at Valea Vișeului. A passenger service over the link is proposed; this would be operated by Ukrainian Railways as an extension of its existing services to Rakhiv.
A non-electrified single track line between Teresva and Câmpulung la Tisa, Romania, is out of service.
A non-electrified dual gauge single track line between Vynohradiv and Halmeu, Romania. The 1435mm gauge track once provided a through route without break of gauge between Hungary, Slovakia, and Romania; that traffic now predominantly uses alternative routes within the European Union. Traffic on the cross-border link is now almost entirely 1520mm gauge, with gauge transshipment at Halmeu.
Hungary
A non-electrified 1435mm gauge double track line between Chop and Záhony, Hungary, with gauge transshipment at Chop. An extension of the 1435mm gauge from Chop to Mukachevo, formed by converting the existing 1520mm gauge line to dual gauge, opened in 2018. Regular passenger trains provided by Hungarian Railways run as far as Mukachevo, and there is the option of freight transshipment at Mukachevo istead of Chop. An overnight sleeper service using Ukrainian Railways rolling stock operates in each direction between Kyiv, Budapest and Wien (Austria), with a gauge change at Chop. A second train between Kyiv and Budapest was added in December, 2024. From December, 2025, through services without break of gauge were possible to Uzhhorod, see Slovakia below.
Slovakia
A 1435mm gauge single track line electrified at 3000V DC between Chop and Čierna nad Tisou, Slovakia, with gauge transshipment at Chop. Passenger trains operated by Slovakian Railways provide a twice daily service over the link. A regular overnight service between Prague and Chop, provided by Czech operator RegioJet, began in March, 2024. Extension of these services to Mukachevo is proposed, which will involve electrification of the Chop to Mukachevo line described in the Hungary section above. The electrification will be financed by RegioJet. A dual gauge line parallel to the cross border link, part of the international link described above under Romania, is closed.
A non-electrified dual gauge single line between Uzhhorod and Vel’ké Kapušany, Slovakia. It is not clear where gauge transshipment takes place. At one time the 1520mm gauge extended beyond Vel’ké Kapušany as far as steel works in Košice.
The two links with Slovakia and the link with Hungary have been unified with the construction of a new standard gauge railway, about 22km in length, alongide the existing line between Chop and Uzhhorod. The line, part funded by the Connecting Europe initiative, opened in September, 2025. Regular daytime passenger services operate from Uzhhorod to Bratislava, Wien, and Budapest, without change of gauge. The line was electrified in September, 2026. A short continuation of the electrification from Chop to the Hungarian border is expected to be completed by the end of the year, which will allow through services without a change of locomotive.
Poland
A non-electrified 1435mm gauge single track line between Starzhava and Krościenko, Poland, closed since 2010, was reopened in February, 2023. In addition to long distance international traffic it is expected to host a regional passenger service between the Polish communities of Malchowice and Krościenko, running via Khyriv in Ukraine.
A non-electrified dual gauge line between Nizhankovychy and Przemyśl, Poland, closed and lifted for many years, was reopened in February, 2023. It is expected to form part of the regional service mentioned in the entry above.
Parallel 1435mm and 1520mm gauge lines electrified at 3000V DC between Mostyska and Przemyśl, Poland. Gauge transshipment of freight which took place at Chałupki Medyckie, a major freight yard on the Polish side of the border, can now take place at Mostyska. 1520mm gauge passenger trains can run through to Przemyśl Główny station, providing direct interchange with trains of Polish Railways and numerous international services. Regular passenger services operate each way between Przemyśl Główny and cities in Ukraine: Kyiv, Dnipro, Odesa, Zaporizhzhia (all daily) and Lviv (twice daily). Services were enhanced in December, 2025. It is planned to extend the standard gauge line from Mostyska to Sknyliv on the outskirts of Lviv, a distance of about 75km. Funding by Connecting Europe, announced in July, 2025, will allow work to commence on the new line.
A non-electrified single track line between Rava-Ruska and Werchrata, Poland, with gauge transshipment at Werchrata. The 1520mm gauge formerly extended as far as Kaplisze.
A non-electrified 1435mm gauge single track line between Rava-Ruska and Hrebenne, Poland, is out of use and appears to be severed at the border crossing.
A non-electrified single track line between Ludyn and Hrubieszów, Poland. Gauge transshipment is available at Hrubieszów, but the 1520mm gauge line continues (as Polish company LHS), in part paralleling 1435mm gauge lines, to factories and interchange yards in the Sławków area.
A non-electrified dual gauge single track line between Yahodyn and Dorohusk, Poland. The 1520mm gauge line runs parallel to the electrified 1435mm gauge line to Chełm, where the majority of gauge transshipment takes place, and from where a 1520mm gauge branch runs to Zawadówka. Carries one daily passenger service each way between Kyiv and Chełm, also an overnight sleeper service each way between Kyiv and Warszawa, with a gauge change at Chełm. From December, 2025, services within Ukraine were extended as far as Dnipro and Kharkiv. Feasibility studies are being conducted for a new 1435mm gauge high speed railway from Warszawa to Lviv and Kyiv, which would enter Ukraine alongside, or near, this border crossing.
Belarus
All cross-border links with Belarus have been closed since the Russian invasion of 2022. Belarusian Railways are 1520mm gauge so no transshipment would be required.
A non-electrified single track line between Zabolottya and Sushitnitsa, Belarus. Part of a major through route between Kovel and Brest.
A non-electrified single track line between Udryts’k and Bukhlichi, Belarus.
A single track line electrified at 25kV AC between Nedanchychi and Semykhody near Chornobyl, passing through Yolcha in Belarus with no connection to Belarusian Railways. Until 1986, the line formed part of a through route from Chernihiv to Ovruch. It closed as a through route following the catastophe at the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant. The line was retained as far as Semykhody to move men and equipment in and out of the exclusion zone. In 2021 an alternative route into the exclusion zone was re-established from Ovruch, in order to service a nuclear waste repository established in the zone. The through route via Yolcha was closed by 2022. The line from Chernihiv to Slavutych remains in use for local services.
A non-electrified single track line between Dobryanka and Gomel, Belarus.
A non-electrified double track line between Derevyny and Gomel, Belarus.
Russia
Railway crossings between government controlled parts of Ukraine and Russia are closed. The status of crossings between secessionist controlled areas and Russia is unknown, but it is known that at least some of them were in use to carry supplies. Action by Ukrainian forces from September 2022, aims to compromise the status of these supply lines.
A non-electrified single track line between Semenivka and Klimovo, Russia.
A non-electrified single track line between Znob-Novhorods’ke and Vitemlya, Russia.
A double track line electrified at 25kV AC between Seredyna-Buda and Suzemka, Russia. This was formerly a major route for international traffic, including through passenger services from Moscow to Kyiv.
A non-electrified single track line between Druzhba and Vorozhba crosses the Russian frontier several times but makes no connection with Russian Railways.
A non-electrified single track line between Volfyne and Glushkovo, Russia.
A non-electrified single track line between Pushkarne and Proletarskii, Russia.
A non-electrified single track line between Odnorobivka and Proletarskii, Russia.
A double track line electrified at 3000V DC between Kozacha Lopan’ and Belgorod, Russia.
A non-electrified single track line between Vovchansk and Belgorod, Russia.
A double track line electrified at 25kV AC between Topoli and Valuyki, Russia.
A non-electrified single track line between Troits’ke and Valuyki, Russia.
A non-electrified single track line between Vil’khove and Krasnovka, Russia.
A non-electrified single track line between Izvaryne and Likhovskoy, Russia.
A non-electrified single track line between Voznesenivka and Gukovo, Russia.
A single track line electrified at 25kV AC between Kvashyne and Avilo-Uspenka, Russia.
In 2023 it was reported that a new line was under construction from Taganrog, Russia, into Donećk Oblast where it would connect with existing railways. It is likely to be non-electrified.
There was a train ferry operated by Russian Railways between Kerch, in Krym, and Port Kavkaz, near Chushka, Russia. In 2019, a new bridge carrying a non-electrified double track railway opened across the Kerch Strait, intended to replace the ferry services. However, lack of capacity led to the ferry service being maintained, and security concerns following attacks on the bridge in 2022 and 2023 have led to continued use of the ferry being increasingly significant.
Until 2022, Ukrainian Railways operated train ferries from the port of Chornomorsk (known as Illichivs’k before 2015) south of Odesa to Derince and Samsun in Türkiye and to Batumi in Georgia. These services ceased with the Russian naval blockade of Ukraine’s Black Sea coast, and have not been resumed.
Following the Russian invasion and in the light of Ukraine’s application to join the European Union, the European Commission has amended its TEN-T proposals for the future development of railways in Europe to include Ukraine. The revised proposals were accepted by the European Parliament in Arpil 2024. The lines of the TEN-T core network in Ukraine are planned to include:
It is expected that the proposed railways would be of 1435mm gauge, either newly built or converted from existing lines.
In January, 2023, Ukrainian Railways signed an agreement with Polish entity CPK for a feasibility study into a new 1435mm high speed rail line from central Poland to Lviv and Kyiv.
Most of the children’s railways (former pioneer railways) listed here were operating until late 2021. They would then have closed for the winter season, and did not reopen during 2022. However, most had resumed operations by mid 2023. All are 750mm gauge, diesel hauled.
In the early days of the Russian invasion, Kyiv came under considerable bombardment causing damage to infrastructure. Portions of the Metro were damaged and some stations of the Metro were closed for service in order to act as bomb shelters. In some instances trains were parked at these stations in order to provide additional and slightly more comfortable capacity for those sheltering. By July extensive repairs had been made and services returned more or less to normal. As in other cities, various streets and other locations had their name changed to remove Russian references. In Kyiv, the changes were in part determined by a public vote sponsored by the Metro operator.
Tram services were also affected by the initial bombardment, and by restrictions on movement above ground, although at least a skeleton service on one or two routes was able to operate throughout. In addition to damage to vehicles and infrastructure, there was a problem of shortage of drivers, with the majority of working age males being eligible for military service. Nevertheless, it is believed that by August or earlier, some kind of service was operating on most routes.
In March, 2023, eight new trams entered service, the first batch of an order for 20 trams placed with Odesa based manufacturer Tatra-Yug in 2021. Much is being made of the fact that they contain steel which was produced at the Azovstal works in Mariupol before it was destroyed in the Russian invasion.
Also in March, 2023, Poland agreed to provide Kyiv Metro with 60 trains, previously in use on the Warsaw Metro. Although the Metrovagonmash built cars date from the 1990s, they are considerably newer than part of the ageing Kyiv fleet that they will replace. Plans for a new build fleet of cars for Kyiv have been on hold since the start of the Russian invasion. The first batch of 6 trains arrived in May. They will require gauge conversion from 1435mm to 1520mm.
In December, 2023, water and sand ingress to the Blue Line Metro tunnels between Lybidska and Demiivska led to closure of that section. Trains from central Kyiv terminated at Libidska, while a shuttle service was operated on the isolated section between Demiivska and the outer terminus at Teremky. The damage to the tunnels appears to have been caused by unstable ground conditions unrelated to the ongoing hostilities. Repairs were completed in September, 2024, and the entire line reopened to traffic.
In early 2024, trams and express trams were operating on all routes except for a section between Kurenivskyi Park and Kontraktova Square. This section was restored to operation in January, 2025. The funicular operated as normal throughout.
On 6th June 2025, following overnight drone damage in eastern Kyiv, services were suspended on the open air portion of Metro Red Line east of Dnipro station. Services were restored as debris was cleared.
Following the uprising of 2014, Avdiivka became part of the front line between secessionist and goverment forces. It changed hands several times, with a major battle in 2017 largely destroying infrastructure. Any tram services that may have operated up until that time ceased. Following the 2022 invasion, although hostilities continued, the city remained in government control until February, 2024, when the Ukrainian army withdrew from the ruined city.
The city of Dnipropetrovsk officially changed its name to Dnipro in 2016. Although not immune from bombardment, its central location has made it an important hub for evacuation of refugees and reception of humanitarian aid. Metro and tram systems have remained operational throughout. In May, 2024, the city took delivery of 26 modernised Tatra T4D-M1 trams donated by the German city of Leipzig. They were to be converted from 1435mm to 1520mm gauge locally.
In 2024, contractors were invited to submit expressions of interest for the construction of a 4km extension of the existing 7km Metro from its present terminus at Vokzalna (the main railway station) into the city centre. Work had commenced on the extension, but ceased in 2022 with the Russian invasion, and the contractors of the time withdrew from the project.
In 2025, Dnipro placed an order for 5 new trams from a Ukrainian manufacturer.
Donećk is one of the cities that came under control of secessionists in 2014. Tram services ceased operating for a time, but were subsequently restored. They were reported as operating normally in 2021 and are believed to have continued doing so. The northern section of line 1 from the railway station was closed for refurbishment for several months in 2024 but reopened in October.
Druzhkivka came under secessionist control in 2014 but was recaptured by government forces. Since the invasion of 2022 it has remained in government control, although subject to heavy bombardment by Russian forces. Tram infrastructure suffered heavy damage and tram operations ceased. Service was resumed on route 1 in June 2022, other routes remained out of service. By December 2024, a limited service was operating on all routes. In April, 2025, the tram depot suffered a drone strike, destroying 2 trams and damaging many others. The following day, services were reported to be operating in a very limited manner. In October, 2025, following further shelling by Russian forces, the decision was taken to close the system indefinitely, and the remaining trams were taken out of the city for safety.
Horlivka came under secessionist control in 2014. Severe fighting followed as government forces attempted to retake it. Considerable infrastructure damage resulted, although much remedial work has taken place. In late 2023 trams were operating on all routes in the city centre, but services on route 8 were terminating at the tram depot. It was reported that a number of restored trams from Mariupol had been added to the fleet to bolster services.
Tram services were suspended in August, 2024, following drone attacks on power infrastructure. It is believed they were restored by the end of the month.
The city of Dniprodzerzhynsk officially changed its name to Kamianske in 2016. The city has come under intermittent bombardment since the invasion of 2022, but all tram services continue to operate.
As in Kyiv, Metro stations, some with parked trains, were used as bomb shelters in the early days of the Russian invasion. The Metro survived intact until June, 2022 when a missile attack caused damage resulting in the closure of part of the Saltivska Line.
Heavy bombardment in March, 2022 caused considerable damage to tram infrastructure and vehicles, including destruction of the principal depot. A limited service resumed operation on four routes from late May. Bombardment in mid-November targeting power infrastructure caused further disruption to tram, trolleybus and Metro services. A fifth tram route was added in February, 2023, following completion of repairs to the depot and the delivery of a number of additional trams released by cities in Czechia. The Metro resumed full operation in March, 2023. Funding has been promised by the European Investment Bank towards complete reconstruction of all modes.
In view of ongoing hostilities, Metro stations continue to be used as bomb shelters, even while trains are still running. In a few instances, a part of the station has been reconfigured as a school, used throughout the daytime so that children may continue their education without interruption. The sense of safety and normality that these facilities have provided has led to the construction of new, underground school premises on other sites.
In June, 2023, tenders were invited for the supply of 8 new Metro trainsets.
In July, 2023, it was announced that the city will receive a donation of 9 trams from Plzeň in Czechia. Some of these may be used for spare parts, others will be regauged from 1435mm to 1520mm using bogies from trams destroyed by Russian bombardment.
By December, 2023, trams were operating on all lines with the exception of the Ring Road routes 23 and 26, and a section of route 12 between Central Park and Lisopark.
In April, 2024, tram services were again suspended following attacks on power infrastrucure, but were subsequently restored.
A partial service on route 23, running between Saltivska and the routes 6/8 terminus at 602-i Microdistrict was reinstated in August, 2024. Work to reinstate the closed section of route 12 is ongoing.
Konotop came under Russian occupation in February, 2022. It appears that under local agreement infrastructure was not materially damaged and public transport continued to operate. Russian forces had withdrawn by April, and trams remained operational, albeit with a reduced service. In March, 2023, the depleted tram fleet was augmented by a number of vehicles donated by the city of Warszawa, Poland. They were regauged from 1435mm to 1520mm in the workshops of Konotop.
In December, 2023, a further batch of second hand trams was received, in this case from the Czech city of Ostrava. Further trams were received in January. As with the Polish trams, they required regauging.
In May, 2024, tram services were suspended following Russian attacks on local power supply infrastructure, but were restored within a few days.
On the night of 11/12 September, 2024, Konotop came under heavy drone attack, which amongst other damage severed the main tram route through the city centre along Prospekt Myru. Ironically, Prospekt Myru translates as Avenue of Peace. Tram services along the Prospekt were discontinued, but had been restored by December.
Kryvyi Rih has come under intermittent air and missile bombardment since the start of the Russian invasion. Trams and trolleybuses remained operational, although by October, 2022, they were running at around 50% as a power conservation measure. Services ceased in late November following an attack on power infrastructure, but tram services had resumed within a week.
Luhansk came under secessionist control in 2014 bringing a halt to tram services. It is believed that they never resumed. In 2022, it was reported that all overhead wiring had been removed.
Lviv has been the target of only sporadic long range attacks and tram services have operated more or less normally throughout; however an attack on 23 November targeting power infrastructure brought tram and trolleybus services to a halt for a time.
In 2024, Swiss funding was agreed for a 1km extension of Line 6 from the existing terminus on Ivan Mykolaichuk Street to the Clinical Municipal Communal Emergency Hospital. The city of Bern, Switzerland, agreed to donate 11 redundant but serviceable trams to Lviv; in 2025, Basel offered 33 further trams. The tram systems of Basel, Bern, and Lviv are all metre gauge, so no gauge conversion is needed.
The city and its infrastructure, which included a tram network, were almost entirely destroyed during the siege lasting from March to May, 2022. The local administration set in place by occupying Russian forces reopened a tram route on 2 May, 2023, serving a 10km section of former Route 10 between Boika Avenue and the Regional Intensive Care Hospital.
The city was surrounded by Russian forces during February and March, 2022. It is reported that trams continued to operate a reduced service during this period. Russian forces had withdrawn by April, and trams remain operational.
Destruction of water supply pipelines has created a need for a system of distributing fresh water around the city. This has been done partly with bottled water and road tankers, but from October a water carrying works tram took part in the operation. From November it was joined by another tram, specially equipped with suitable tanks, and by two trolleybuses similarly adapted.
In March, 2026, it was announced that the city of Göteborg, Sweden, would donate 40 trams, due for replacement during the coming year, to Mykolaiv. They will require regauging from 1435mm to 1520mm.
Since the start of the Russian invasion, Odesa has been the target of several long range missile attacks, but it is believed that no major damage has been caused to infrastructure and that trams and the funicular continue to operate. In September, 2022, following completion of upgrades to the network that had been in progress for several years, an extended route 7 service was launched between the Kyivskyi to Suvorovskyi districts, running via the city centre. At 29km, it is one of the longest tram routes in Europe, second only to the Belgian Kusttram.
In December, 2022, 13 new trams were ordered from Ukrainian manufacturer Tatra-Yug. The first of these was delivered in 2023, to enter service in early 2024.
A missile attack in July, 2022, is reported to have disrupted tram services for a time, but services were restored.
In the early 21st century, Vinnytsia began a programme of replacing its ageing Czech built trams with second-hand vehicles donated by the city of Zurich, Switzerland. By 2011, around 105 vehicles had been received. In 2015, a few of the remaining older vehicles were extensively modernized, but the project was not pursued further on the grounds of cost. In 2021, Zurich agreed to provide a further tranche of second-hand vehicles; delivery was delayed by the onset of the Russian invasion, but 35 vehicles were delivered in 2023, with a further 31 expected to follow in 2024. These are all of the Tram 2000 type, manufactured mainly in the 1990s. The tram systems of Zurich and Vinnytsia are both metre gauge, so no gauge conversion is needed. In 2025 it was announced that the ex-Zurich trams would be retrofitted with low floor centre sections, designed in Switzerland but maufactured in Ukraine.
The city came under secessionist control in 2014. Tram services continued to operate, and in September, 2022, it was reported that the tram fleet was being augmented by additional vehicles brought in from Russia. During the summer of 2026, the bridge over the railway on Vulytsya Tiunova in the north of the city was closed for repairs, affecting tram services on routes 3 and 4.
Yevpatoria is located in Krym, which self-declared its independence from Ukraine and its union with Russia in 2014. In early 2024, trams were reported to be operating on routes 1 and 3. Route 2 resumed services in June, 2026.
Although still in government control, Zaporizhzhia has been under continued attack by Russian forces since the start of the 2022 invasion. For some time, tram services operated during daylight hours, with a nighttime curfew. By early 2024 it appears that normal service had been resumed on all routes, with the exception of route 8 to Kremniypolimer, which is no longer operating.
Zhytomyr was subject to several attacks in the early months of the Russian invasion, but no major damage to tram infrastructure was reported and trams and trolleybuses remained operational until November, 2022, when services were suspended following attacks on the electricity supply infrastructure. Trolleybus services were able to resume in December, trams in March, 2023.
© 2004-2026 Glyn Williams
Photo image Beata Zawrzel/NurPhoto